(Only in Italian)
Il trend di segnalazioni di operazioni sospette riconducibili a virtual asset è in progressiva crescita: da appena 566 SOS ricevute nel 2019 si è passati a 3.453 nel 2021, fino a superare 5.000 nel 2022.
Il contributo segnaletico più rilevante si conferma quello fornito dagli intermediari bancari e finanziari, che percepiscono il rischio connesso con tali strumenti, in particolare a causa delle difficoltà di tracciare i relativi flussi.
La collaborazione attiva degli operatori in valute virtuali (c.d. Virtual Asset Service Provider) è ancora polarizzata sui principali operatori italiani.
L’avvio del censimento dei VASP attivi in Italia, oltre a consentire una maggiore trasparenza nel comparto e una conseguente mitigazione dei relativi rischi, sta favorendo l’ampliamento della platea dei soggetti registrati in RADAR ai fini della segnalazione di operazioni sospette.
I sospetti più ricorrenti concernenti le valute virtuali riguardano l’origine dei fondi utilizzati per l’acquisto delle stesse, spesso correlati a possibili illeciti fiscali, frodi informatiche o episodi di ransomware.
Sono state rilevate ipotesi di truffe nel trading online e di investimenti eseguiti dalle vittime dei raggiri presso piattaforme estere, spesso non autorizzate, a seguito di contatti telefonici insistenti o tramite l’intermediazione di asseriti consulenti finanziari; l’investimento in virtual asset è sovente offerto applicando basse commissioni, in virtù di presunte partnership con i principali exchanger.
Altre casistiche ricorrenti riguardano lo svolgimento dell’attività di exchanger in assenza di adeguate strutture organizzative a tutela dei clienti e il mancato rispetto delle disposizioni in materia di antiriciclaggio.
La qualità delle segnalazioni inerenti al comparto presenta, d’altra parte, margini di miglioramento. In alcuni casi le SOS non risultano tempestive nella rilevazione dei sospetti né complete di tutte le informazioni necessarie per lo sviluppo finanziario e investigativo4 , apparendo essenzialmente cautelative; a volte sono indotte dalla mera rilevazione di notizie pregiudizievoli su fonti aperte o soltanto dalla ricezione di una richiesta di informazioni da parte dell’Autorità giudiziaria o degli Organi investigativi.
Inoltre, continua la UIF, spesso il sospetto non è adeguatamente circostanziato con riguardo ai profili soggettivi e oggettivi dell’operatività.
This roadmap on sustainable finance builds on and replaces the EBA’s first action plan on sustainable finance published in December 2019. The roadmap ensures continuity of actions assumed under the previous action plan, while accommodating the necessary adjustments following the market and regulatory developments, including new mandates and new areas of focus.
In the area of transparency and disclosures, the EBA will continue its work related to the development and implementation of institutions’ ESG risks and wider sustainability disclosures. Similarly, the EBA will continue its efforts to ensure that ESG factors and risks are adequately integrated in institutions’ risk management framework and in their supervision, including through further developments on climate stress tests. In the area of prudential regulation, the EBA has initiated an assessment of whether amendments to the existing prudential treatment of exposures to incorporate environmental and social considerations would be justified. Furthermore, the EBA will contribute to the development of green standards and labels, and measures to address emerging risks in this field, such as greenwashing. Finally, the EBA will be assessing and monitoring developments in sustainable finance and institutions’ ESG risk profile, including on the basis of the expected supervisory reporting.
The roadmap was developed based on the current state of the regulatory framework and reflects the EBA’s current expectations regarding specific mandates and tasks. However, considering the ongoing regulatory developments, including the review of the banking package (CRR/CRD), the scope and timelines of specific tasks will only be fully known once the legislative processes are finalised.
In the first climate stress test of the sector, EIOPA set out to assess the resilience of IORPs against a climate change scenario that simulates a sudden, disorderly transition to a green economy as a consequence of the delayed implementation of policy measures. While the stress test is not a pass or fail exercise, findings indicate that IORPs have a material exposure to transition risks.
EIOPA adopted a full balance sheet approach to examine the impact on IORPs’ asset portfolios as well as on their long-term liabilities. The exercise followed a dual methodology: in addition to a national balance sheet (NBS) approach based on national valuation regulation, a common balance sheet (CBS) approach with mark-to-market valuations was used to make meaningful comparisons possible.
Due to the nature of the disorderly transition scenario, the exercise focused on the asset portfolio of IORPs. The results show that IORPs are materially exposed to transition risks. On the asset side, the stress scenario provoked a sizeable overall drop of 12.9%, corresponding to asset valuation losses of some €255 billion. The bulk of the drop in value showed up in equity and bond investments. IORPs on average had around 6% of their equity and 10% of their corporate bond investments in carbon intensive industries such as mining, electricity & gas and land transport, for which the scenario prescribed steep write-downs of between 20% and 38%.
The scenario, which included interest rate movements, also affected the liability side. Liabilities decreased due to the rise in risk-free rates, which helped cushion the impact of asset side devaluations on the funding ratio even though they did not fully offset the drop. Financial positions therefore still worsened slightly. While funding ratios decreased by 2.5pp (from 122.7% to 120.2%) according to the national and by 2.9pp (from 119.9% to 117.0%) according to the common methodology, post-shock aggregate funding ratios in DB schemes remained above 100% in most Member States – due, in part, to strong pre-shock positions.
The stress test was complemented by a qualitative survey on mitigation and adaptation measures, which revealed that although IORPs are increasingly considering ESG factors in their investment decisions, they still experience noteworthy hurdles in allocating investments to climate risk-sensitive categories. Only 14% of IORPs reported using environmental stress testing in their own risk management. Importantly, results indicate that this subgroup performed better in the exercise than their peers that do not conduct such analyses, suggesting that own climate stress testing helps IORPs position themselves better against transition risks.
Another qualitative survey connected to the stress test explored to what extent IORPs seek to mitigate the negative effects of inflation on the purchasing power of future benefits. 55% of DB IORPs said they offer schemes where benefits are directly linked to inflation. 67% of all IORPs said they aimed to outperform inflation with their investment strategies or at least had among their targets the mitigation of inflation’s effects.
