On the occasion of the approval of the 2021 financial statements and subsequent financial reports, Consob draws the attention of listed companies and other supervised issuers to the following issues coordinated within ESMA:
  • disclose as soon as possible any inside information regarding the impacts of the crisis on fundamentals, prospects and financial situation, in line with the transparency obligations under the Market Abuse Regulation, unless the conditions exist to delay publication of the same; And
  • provide information, as far as possible on both a qualitative and quantitative basis, on the current and foreseeable effects, direct and indirect, of the crisis on commercial activities, on the exposures to the affected markets, on the supply chains, on the financial situation and on the economic results in relations 2021 financial statements, if these have not yet been approved, and in the annual shareholders’ meeting or otherwise in the interim financial reports.
Auditors and control bodies are expected to pay particular attention, as part of their auditing activity on financial relations, to the above-mentioned issues, having particular regard to the effects for the issuer and for the subsidiaries of the restrictive measures adopted by the EU.
In light of the recent recommendations released by the National Cybersecurity Agency, particular attention must be paid to assessing the risks associated with cybersecurity. Therefore, we would like to point out the opportunity to set up adequate and effective organizational and technical safeguards aimed at mitigating this risk, also providing for the strengthening of information flows with the supervisory bodies.
(Only in Italian)
Nella Dichiarazione del 26 febbraio 2022 i Governi di Francia, Germania, Italia, Regno Unito, Canada e Stati Uniti hanno espresso una condanna congiunta della guerra di aggressione condotta dalla Russia contro l’Ucraina, preannunciando l’adozione di molteplici iniziative e misure contro esponenti del regime russo.

Tra queste iniziative figura l’istituzione di una “Transatlantic Task Force” incaricata di favorire l’efficace applicazione delle sanzioni finanziarie attraverso l’individuazione e il congelamento dei beni riconducibili ai soggetti designati.
Nel quadro della Task Force intergovernativa le Financial Intelligence Unit di Australia, Canada, Francia, Germania, Italia, Giappone, Olanda, Nuova Zelanda, Regno Unito e Stati Uniti hanno istituito un Gruppo di Lavoro per sviluppare attività e collaborazione per contribuire alle iniziative in corso.
Gli obiettivi del Gruppo di Lavoro sono enunciati nella “Dichiarazione di Intenti” approvata dalle FIU il 16 marzo 2022:
  • contribuire all’efficace applicazione delle misure restrittive decise dalla comunità internazionale, fornendo indicazioni al settore privato e contrastando comportamenti elusivi;
  • impiegare gli strumenti delle analisi e della collaborazione per individuare e “tracciare” beni riferibili alla nomenclatura russa;
  • Viene al contempo richiamata la diversità di compiti e poteri assegnati alle FIU nel comparto delle sanzioni finanziarie, di cui è auspicabile l’ampliamento e il rafforzamento.
The changes to these Guidelines do not alter the overall SREP framework but affect its main elements, including (i) business model analysis, (ii) assessment of internal governance and institution-wide control arrangements, (iii) assessment of risks to capital and adequacy of capital to cover these risks, and (iv) assessment of risks to liquidity and funding and adequacy of liquidity resources to cover these risks.
The main amendments are aiming at:
  • better articulating the principle of proportionality, through the categorisation of institutions and the application of the minimum engagement model;
  • fully incorporating the assessment of the money laundering and terrorist financing (ML/TF) risks, in line with the EBA Opinion on how to take into account ML/TF risks in the SREP;
  • reviewing the provisions on Pillar 2 capital add-ons and the Pillar 2 guidance, to ensure they reflect a purely micro-prudential perspective and appropriately implement the separate stack of own funds requirements based on the leverage ratio;
  • aligning the assessment of the interest rate risk in the non-trading book, as well as the assessment of liquidity risk and liquidity adequacy with the current regulatory framework;
  • enhancing the dialogue among institutions and supervisors in relation to the setting of the Pillar 2 requirements.
These draft RTS clarify the requirements to be met for estimating PDs and LGDs under the default risk model.
The draft RTS specify that an internal methodology used to calculate PDs and LGDs under the default risk model should meet all requirements applicable to the corresponding Internal ratings‐based (IRB) approach.
In addition, the draft RTS include the possibility for institutions to produce conservative ‘fallback’ PD and LGD values to be used only where needed. Finally, these RTS specify the requirements that external sources are to fulfil for their use under the default risk model, ensuring that the methodology employed to derive the PDs and LGDs from these sources is conceptually sound.